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CLARENCE W. COUGHLIN et aI., Respondents, v. JOHN 
H. BLAIR et al., Appellants. 
[la,lb] AgenC7-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Lia-
bility of Agent.-Rule that agent who acts for disclosed prin-
cipal and is dealt with by third party as agent does not 
ordinarily incur personal liability is inapplicable where lan-
guage of realty purchase agreement which he signed opposite 
word "agent" indicates that parties intended he should be 
personally liable for surveying and for installing improve-
ments. 
[2] Id.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Instruments 
in Agent's Name-Evidence.-If fact of agency appears in an 
integrated contract and there is no unambiguous expression of 
intention either to make or not make agent a party thereto, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show intention of parties. 
[3a,3b] Husband and Wife - Agency - Evidence.-Where word 
"agent" appears before name of person ~igning realty purchase 
agreement and there is a blank following word "owner," but 
reference to signer's wife as person who would receive down 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 132; Am.Jur., Agency. § 314 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Agency, §167; [2] Agency, §177; 
[3] Husband and Wife, § 152; [4] Vendor and Purchaser, § 364: 
[5,28-30] Vendor and Purchaser, § 363(3); [6] Agency, § 211; [7] 
Stipulations, § 18; [8] Damages, § 11; [9] Damages, § 214; {10, 11, 
16, 20, 23, 24] Damages, § 72; [12-14, 22] Contracts, § 241; [15] 
Vendor and Purchaser, ~ 152; [17, 18] Vendor and Purchaser, 
§ 365 (2); [19,21,25] Vendor and Purchaser, § 365(1); [26] Dam-
ages, § 38; [27] Evidence, § 398. 
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payment as liquidated damages suggests that she is the prin4 
eipaI, and where instrument also contains language indicating 
that husband was to be liable as party to contract for surveying 
and for installing improvements, so that it cannot be de1lnitely 
ascertained from instrument whether he signed solely as agent 
or personally assumed obligation to perform contract, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible t.o determine intention of parties. 
[4] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-
Nonsnit.-Where person who signed realty purchase agreement 
opposite word "agent" stated that "he would pave" road to 
property involved and, in response to purchaser's question 
regarding time the utilities and pavement would be installed, 
stated "probably by September everything would be in shape 
because he had invested $185,000 in bulldozing and he wanted 
to get started getting his money out of the tract so he was 
not going to lose any time in proceeding with the improvements 
in the tract."and where such person was joined as a defendant 
in purchasers' action against lot owner for breach of agree-
ment to install such improvements. trial court properly denied 
such defendant's motion for a uonsuit. 
[5] ld.-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-Evidence.-In pur-
chasers' action against lot owner and her husband, who had 
signed purchase agreement opposite word "agent," for breach 
of agreement to install utilities and pave road to property 
involved, court's determination that it was intention of parties 
that husband be personally liable for performance of contract 
is sustained by testimony of his brother, who acted as husband's 
agent and received a commission on sale of lot, that husband 
gave plaintiffs an agreement that he would pave road within a 
year, that he promised to put the gas and electricity in at a 
certain time, and that he said ill one year's time "he thought 
he would have it all in." 
[6] Agency-Undisclosed Agency-Election to Hold Principal or 
Agent.-Rule that party suing on contract may be forced to 
elect between judgment against an undisclosed principal and 
judgment against his agent is inapplicable where evidence dis-
closes that defendant was not only a party to a realty purchase 
agreement but that he also acted as an agent, and deposit 
receipt at least indirectly identified lot owner as his principal. 
[7] Stipulations-Effect as Estoppel.-A stipulation at outset of 
trial that person signing realty· purchase agreement acted as 
agent for lot owner and that he had full authority to act as 
such agent precludes sueh lot owner's successor in intel"est 
from successfully I'ontending that lot owner was an un dis-
elosed principal and that. by obtaining a judgment against 
signer of agr~ement for breach of contract to install improve-
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 171; Am.Jur., AgPDCY, § 204. 
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ments, plainti1Is elected to release lot owner's successor in 
interest from liability. 
[8] Damages-Past and Prospective Damagea.-In action for dam-
ages for total breach of contract, distinction between perma-
nent and temporary injury has no relevance, and plaintiff in 
that action recovers all his damages, past and prospective. 
[9] ld-Judgment-Effect.-A judgment for plaintiff in action for 
total breach of contract absolves defendant from any duty, 
continuing or otherwise, to perform contract; the judgment for 
damages is substituted for wrongdoer's duty to perform con-
tract. 
[10] ld.-Total Breach of Oontract.-If there is a total breach of 
contract, plaintiffs may properly bring an action for all their 
damages, general and special j since any subsequent action for 
additional damages would be successfully opposed by plea of 
res judicata, plaintiffs' injury is necessarily permanent. 
[11] ld.-Pa.rtial Breach of Contraet.-If breach of contract is 
partial only, injured party may recover damages for nonper-
formance only to time of trial and may not recover damages 
for anticipated future nonperformance. 
[12] Oontracts-Breach-Total or Partial Breach.-If a breach of 
contract is total, injured party may treat it as partial unless 
wrongdoer has repudiated contract. 
[1S] ld.-Breach-Total or Partial Breach.-The circumstances of 
each case determine whether injured party may treat breach of 
contract as total. 
[14] lel.-Breach-Total or Partial Breach.-If injured party has 
fully performed his obligations under bilateral contract, courts 
usually treat a breach as partial unless it appears that per-
formance of agreement is unlikely and that injured party may 
be protected only by recovery of damages for value of promise. 
[15] Vendor and Purchaser-Performance of Oontract-Breach.-
Plaintiffs suing for breach of realty purchase agreement to in-
staU utilities and pave road to property involved were justi1led 
in treating defendants' nonperformance as a total breach of 
contract, where after delay of one year, despite plaintiffs' re-
peated requests, defendants had not installed improvements 
called for by contract, where it was uncertain when if ever 
they would do so, and where their conduct justified plaintiffs' 
belief that performance was either unlikely or would be forth-
coming only when it suited defendants' convenience. 
[16] Damages-Breach of Contract.-Unless a statute otherwise 
specifically provides, proper measure of damages for breach 
[16] See Cal.JUI., Damages, § 77 .t seq.; Am.Jur., Damages, § 43 
etseq. 
) 
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of contract is amount which will compensate party aggrieved 
for all detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in 
ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom. 
(Civ. Code, § 3300.) 
[17] Vendor and Pnrchaser-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-
Measure of Damages.-Under realty purchase contract calling 
for installation of improvements that would greatly increase 
value of plaintiffs' property, if work were to be ,done on 
plaintiffs' property the proper measure of damages for breach 
of contract would ordinarily be reasonable cost to plaintiffs of 
eompleting work. 
[18] ld.-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-Measure of Dam-
ages.-When improvements called for by realty purchase 
agreement are to be made on property that is not owned by 
party injured by breach of agreement and he is unable to 
complete work himself, the proper measure of damages, sub-
ject to restrictions of Civ. Code, §§ 3300, 3359, is difference in 
value of property with and without promised performance, 
since that is contractual benefit of which injured party is de-
prived. 
[19] ld.-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-Amount of Re-
covery.-In purchasers' action for breach of realty purchase 
agreement to install utilities and pave road to property in-
volved, defendants were not entitled to credit for performance 
of part of their contractual obligations on the ground that the 
theory that the work was performed while plaintiffs treated 
the breach as partial, where it could not be ascertained from 
the record whether or not defendants performed the work be-
fore or after plaintiffs filed their complaint. 
[20] Damages-Breach of Contract.-If injured party accepts or 
urges performance by promisor, he will not be allowed to 
obtain damages on theory that performance has not been made. 
[21] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-
Amount of Recovery.-In purchasers' action for breach of 
realty purchase agreement to install utilities and pave road to 
property involved, defendants should not receive credit for 
performance after complaint was filed and before action came 
to trial, where plaintiffs did not urge performance after com-
plaint was filed and they could not prevent it, since by coru-
mencing action they fully and fairly informed defendants that 
instead of performance they sought money damages for value 
of defendants' promise and thereafter defendants were ab-
solvc::d from all duties under contract to furnish improvements, 
any subsequent work to that end being entirely voluntary and 
not performance of a contract then existent. 
[22] Contracts-Breach-Rights of Wrongdoer.-Parties who have 
totally breached a contract cannot force performance on in-
jured parties. 
I 
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[28] Damages-Breach of Contract.-Damages are awarded in 
action for breach of contract to give injured party benefit 
of his bargain and insofar as possible to place him in same 
position he would have been had promisor performed contract. 
[24] Id.-Breach of Contract.-Damages must be reasonable and 
promisor is not required to compensate injured party for in-
juries that he had no reason to foresee as probable result of 
his breach when he made contract. (Civ. Code, § 3300.) 
[26] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-
Damages for Loss of Use and Increased Building Costs.-Pur-
chasers of realty who are awarded damages for difference in 
value of lot with and without improvements in their action 
for breach of agreement to install utilities and pave road to 
property involved are entitled to damages for loss of use and 
increased building costs preceding date they treated such 
breach as total, that is, date when they instituted action, but 
they are not entitled to this additional award during period 
between date that complaint was filed and date of trial, since 
defendants were no longer obliged to perform during that 
period and any delay in utilization of property after plain-
tiffs filed complaint was chargeable to them, not to defendants. 
[26] Damages-Interest-In Action on Oontract.-In action for 
breach of agreement to install improvements on certain realty, 
interest prior to judgment cannot be awarded under Civ. Code, 
§ 3287, where amount of damages cannot be ascertained except 
on conflicting evidence. 
[27] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation.-
In action for breach of agreement to pave a road, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to determine what parties meant by 
"paving!' (Code Civ. Proc., § 1860.) 
[28] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-
Evidence.-In purchasers' action for breach of realty purchase 
agreement to install utilities and pave road to property in-
volved, a finding that difference between market value of prop-
erty with and without performance of contract was $9,500 is 
sustained by testimony of expert witnesses who gave their 
valuation of property with and without improvements, their 
valuations with improvements necessarily contemplating im-
provements installed by a responsible person. 
[29] Id.-Recovery of Da.mages by Purchaser-Evidence.-In pur-
chasers' action for breach of realty purchase agreement to in-
stan utilities and pave road to property involved, a finding 
that breach of such agreement was deliberate is sustained by 
one defendant's admission that he did not make deposit re-
quired by gas company before it would extend its gas line to 
plaintiffs' lot, although he had financial ability to do so; by 
defendants' failure to accept city's offer to install electricity 
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to plainti1ls' lot without cost to defendants if they would 
waive claim to certain other rights under their contract with 
city; and by defendants' failure to install permanent paving 
because they took position that only temporary paving was 
required by contract. 
[80] ld.-Recovery of Damages by Purchaser-Evidence.-In pur-
chasers' action for breach of realty purchase agreement to in-
atall utilities and pave road to property involved, court's con-
elusion that but for breach plainti1ls would have been able to 
take advantage of lower building costs at time contemplated is 
sustained by evidence that plainti1ls told defendant on day 
contract was signed that they intended to build a "three 
bedroom, rambling house with a playhouse and swimming 
pool," that such a house would exceed 1,500 square feet, that 
they intended to build "the following spring," the time when 
performance was specified in contract, and that they actually 
employed an architect and received plans from him. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. J. T. B. Warne, Judge.- Aftirmed in part 
and reversed in part with directions. 
Action for damages for breaeh of realty purchase contract 
to install utilities and pave road to property involved. Judg-
ment for plaintiffs affirmed as to award of general damages; 
reversed with directions as to award of special damages for 
loss of use of property and from increase in building costs. 
Charles Reagh for Appellants. 
Krystal & Paradise and Robert E. Paradise for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Louise Blair, wife of defendant John Blair, 
owned a tract of land on the hills overlooking Hollywood. 
Part of the tract had been subdivided. Lot 7, the parcel 
involved in the present litigation, is in an unsubdivided part of 
the tract. It is at the apex of a triangular hill and has an 
exceptional view and privacy. In May, 1948, when the con-
tract involved in this action was executed, Lot 7 was graded 
and had access to the public streets by means of a dirt road 
to Nichols Canyon Road, about 3,725 feet away. Gas and 
electricity had not been installed nearer than the intersection 
of Nichols Canyon Road and the dirt road leading to Lot 7. 
Plaintiffs Clarence Coughlin and Cathleen Coughlin, hus-
• Aasigned b7 Chairman of .Tudieial Council. 
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band and wife, viewed the lot several times with defendant 
John Blair. They informed him that they wished to purchase 
the lot and to build a residence thereon within the following 
year. They told him that, "We were ready to sign for the 
property at his price provided he would agree that paving 
would be installed, electricity and gas would be installed, 
all within one year from the date of the agreement; that he 
would have the lot surveyed and staked, all of which was to be 
at his cost and at no cost to us." John Blair was willing to 
sell the property on those terms. Accordingly, on May 30, 
1948, the parties executed on a deposit receipt form the 
contract set forth in the footnote.1 Plaintiff Clarence Cough-
lin testified that he first became aware of Mrs. Blair's name 
after he had looked at the deposit receipt. An escrow was 
opened in the name of Louise Blair. Plaintiffs paid the full 
purchase price of $14,000 and received a deed from Louise 
Blair. The deed granted plaintiffs Lot 7, with a "nonexclusive 
Easement for Ingress and Egress and for driveway purposes" 
to Nichols Canyon R()ad. 
On May 30,1949, the date that performance was due under 
the contract, the paving had not been done and neither gas 
nor electricity had been brought to the lot. During the fol-
lowing year plaintiffs wrote four letters to defendant John 
Blair demanding performance. Defendants did not repUdiate 
the contract; nor did they perform their obligations there-
&('REOEIv.E.D I'JIOK Olarenoe W. Ooughlw.. ,. Oathlem L., Married 
Date May 80th, 1948 
Address 106 N. Maple Dr. Bev. Hill Or. 18648 the sum of .1000.00 being 
a part payment on Lot 7 •• pro.. TrGCt 15175 Mete, ,. Bound DWp. 
(Subject to Restrictions and Reservations of Record) At price of '14000 
payable $. . . . . . .. .... cash (including the within payment) balance 
payable as follows: '7500 i" E,arotD 5500 Balanoe 0" or before July 
15th 1948. Gas ,. Paveme"t I" Elea. to be put at "0 o08t to buyer ..nthi" 
1 f/f' from above date also to b. IUrveyed bg JflO. H. Blair At _. 
Balance of first payment, to-wit: ............ :. dollars to be deposited 
in escrow within . . . . . . . . . . .. clays trom above date and falling to make 
such payments, above amount paid is retained by and torfeited to Louisll 
Blair as liquidated damages. Purchaser agrees to purchase said property 
at above price and terms. Agent reserves the right to refund payment if 
unsatisfaetoryto owner. 
Dated this 80 day of May. 1948 at Loa ,d"gelel, California 
OZGrenoe W.Ooughli" Purchaser Agent Johfl. II. BlGi,. 
Cath/em L. OoughUfI. Purchaser Per .••••••...••........ 
I accept above sale and agree to pa7 •••••••••••••••••••• commission of 
Dated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Owner .•.•••••••••••.............. " 
(Italics represent terms written in the blank spaces on printed form.) 
I 
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under. They did put temporary paving on part of the road 
to Lot 7 in the fall or winter of 1949. Plaintiffs' last letter, 
on April 1, 1950, stated that they would institute B-n action, 
if the contract was not performed within 30 days. On May 
24, 1950, plaintiffs brought this action. They did not seek 
rescission or specific performance. Instead, they sought dam-
ages for the difference in value of the property with and 
without the performance promised in the contract, and special 
damages for the loss of the use of the property and for the 
increase in building costs since the date performance was due. 
At some time in 1950 permanent paving was installed on 
the road to Lot 7 for a distance of 1,200 feet commencing 
from the Nichols Canyon Road. In May of 1950 a gas line 
was installed over the same 1,200 feet. It cannot be ascer· 
tained from the record whether or not these installations pre-
ceded the filing of the complaint; in any event, at that time 
about half only of the remaining 2,525 feet of the road han 
even temporary paving and gas and electricity had not been 
brought to the lot. At the time of the trial, April 20, 1951, th .. 
road was in the same condition. No further work on the g-as 
line was done until the week before trial, when workmen be~an 
laying a line in the direction of Lot 7. Electricity was in-
stalled to a point adjoining Lot 7 in August, 1950. There 
is nothing to show that plaintiffs requested or accepted per-
formance after the complaint was filed. 
Louise Blair was named as a defendant in the complaint, 
but died a few days before trial. Before her death she had 
conveyed to defendant Marion Conger real property of which 
Lot 7 was a part, and Mrs. Conger agreed to assume Louise 
Blair's obligations to plaintiffs arising' from the agreement of 
sale. The parties stipulated that the case should proceed with 
Marion Conger substituting as successor to Louise Blair. The 
trial court concluded that both defendants. John Blair and 
Marion Conger, were personally liable for the breacb of the 
contract. Plaintiffs recovered judgment for $9.500 general 
damages, the difference between the market value of the prop-
erty on May 30, 1949. and the market value it would have had 
at that time had the contract been performed. $2.300.37 special 
damages for the loss of use of the lot. measured by loss of 
use of the $14.000 paid by plaintiffs and computed at 
7 per cent from May 30, 1949. to the date of trial. and $3.700 
special damages for the increase of construction costs be-
tween June, 1949, and the date of trial. 
Defendants appeal, contending: (1) John Blair is not per· 
) 
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son ally liable for nonperformance of the contract; (2) if the 
judgment against John Blair is affirmed, the judgment against 
Marion Conger must be reversed; (3) the award of damages 
is not sustained by the evidence and allows plaintiffs a double 
recovery; and (4) several material findings of the trial court 
are not supported by the evidence. 
1. Liability of John Blair. 
[la] Defendant John Blair contends that he signed the 
contract as an agent only and is not personally liable there-
under. He relies on the rule that an agent who acts for a 
disclosed principal and is dealt with by the third party as 
an agent does not ordinarily incur personal liability. (See, 
2 Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 132, and eases cited.) That rule 
is inapplicable here. [2] If the fact of agency appears in an 
integrated contract, and there is no unambiguous expression 
of an intention either to make or not to make the agent a 
party thereto, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the 
intention of the parties. (Rest., Agency. § 323(2); Carlesimo 
v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.App.2d 482, 488 [197 P.2d 167); Otis 
Elevator Co. v. Berry, 28 Cal.App.2d 430,433 [82 P.2d 704j ; 
ct. Patterson v. John P. Mills etc,. Inc., 203 Cal. 419, 421 
[264 P. 759J.) [3a] In the present case the word "agent" 
appears before John Blair's signature to the contract and 
there is a blank following the word "owner." The reference 
to Louise Blair as the person who would receive the down 
payment as liquidated damages suggests that she is the prin-
cipal. [lb] The words "Gas & Pavement & Elec. to be put at 
no cost to buyer within 1 yr from above date also to be surveyed 
by Jno H. Blair at once" indicate that the parties intended 
that John Blair should be personally liable for the surveying 
and also for installing the improvements. [3b] Thus, the con-
tract gave plaintiffs notice that John Blair was an agent and 
indirectly disclosed the identity of the principal but it. also 
contains language indicating that he was to be liable as a party 
to the contract. Since it cannot be definitely ascertained from 
the instrument whether John Blair signed solely as an agent 
or personally assumed the obligation to perform the contract, 
extrinsic evidence was admissible to determine the intention 
of the parties. (Carlesimo v. Schwebel, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d 
482, 487-489.) 
[4] Plaintiffs conducted all negotiations with John Blair 
at the tract office, marked with a sign "Blair Hills Estates." 
John Blair stated that "he would pave" the road to Lot 7 
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and, in response to Mr. Coughlin's question regarding the time 
the utilities and pavement would be installed, stated "prob-
ably by September everything would be in shape because he 
had invested $185,000 in bulldozing and he wanted to get 
started getting his money out of the tract so he was not 
going to lose any time in proceeding with the improvements 
in the tract." In the light of this evidence the trial court 
properly denied defendant John Blair's motion for a nonsllit. 
[6] Evidence later adduced2 also supports the trial court's 
determination that it was the intention of the parties that 
John Blair be personally liable for performance of the 
contract. Eugene Blair, who was the brother of John Blair 
and who acted as the latter's agent and received a commis-
sion on the sale of the lot, testified, "At the time of my deal 
with Mr. Coughlin it was no argument or discussion about 
the paving. Mr. Blair give them an agreement that he 
would pave it within a year .... Mr. Blair promised to put 
the gas and electricity in at a certain time, a certain time if he 
could do it .... Mr. Blair set it down in the form that I 
drew up and said in one year's time he thought he would have 
it all in." 
2. Liab~1ity of Marion Oonger. 
[6] Defendant Marion Conger contends that affirmance 
of the judgment against John Blair necessitates reversal of 
the judgment against her. She relies on several cases holding 
that a party suing on a contract may be forced to elect be-
tween a judgment against an undisclosed principal and a 
judgment against his agent. (Klinger v. Modesto Fruit 00., 
Inc., 107 Cal. App. 97, 100 [290 P. 127] ; McDevitt v. Oorriea 
(Ohas.) &; Bros., 70 Cal.App. 245, 254 [233 P. 381] ; Ewing 
v. Hayward, 50 Cal.App. 708, 717 [195 P. 970] ; contra: Mont-
gomery v. Dorn, 25 Cal.App. 666, 670 [145 P. 148] ; Jewell 
v. Oolonial Theater 00., 12 Cal.App. 681, 685 [108 P. 527] ; 
McKee v. Ounningham, 2 Cal.App. 684, 688 [84 P. 260] ; see 
Oraig v. Buckley, 218 Cal. 78, 81 [21 P.2d 430]; Rest., 
'Defendant John Blair stated at the close of plaintiff's ease that he 
would "stand on his motion for a nonsuit" and would not introduce 
evidence on his behalf. Defendant Marion Conger introduced evidence 
to defend the action against her and, on cross· examination, plaintiff. 
elicited additional evidence supporting their ease. That evidence may be 
eonsidered by an appellate eourt in reviewing the sufticiency of the evi· 
dence to support the trial eourt's determination that it was the intention 
of the parties that John Blair be personally liable for performance of the 
eontract. (Bee Peter. v. Bouther", Pac. Co., 160 Cal. '8, 52·53 [116 P. 
'00].) 
/ 
) 
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Agency, § 201(1); 39 Cal.L.Rev. 409.) That rule is in-
applicable here. The evidence discloses that John Blair was 
not only a party to the contract but that he also acted as an 
agent, and the deposit receipt at least indirectly identified 
Louise Blair as his principal. (Rest., Agency, §§ 144, 146, 
184; see, Geary St. etc. R. Co. v.Rolph, 189 Cal. 59, 65-66 
[207 P. 539).) Even if we assume that Louise Blair was 
an undisclosed principal the trial court properly refused to 
require plaintiffs to make an election. 
[7] At the outset of the trial it was stipulated that John 
Blair, in signing the agreement, "acted as agent for Louise 
Blair, that he had full authority to act as such agent, and 
that his act bound her." It was further stipulated that Marion 
Conger, as successor in interest to Louise Blair, deceased, 
"expressly assumes and agrees to pay and discharge any and 
all liabilities or obligations claimed or asserted by plaintiffs 
against defendants in the above entitled action, if and as 
adjudicated in this action." Counsel for defendants stated, 
"I stipulated [that this document] bound Mrs. Blair but I 
do not stipulate it bound Mr. Blair. He signed as agent and 
he is not bound except as agent." Counsel for plaintiffs re-
plied, "I accept counsel's stipulation as far as it goes. We, 
of course, contend Mr. Blair was bound, that he acted not 
only as agent for his wife but also acted individually." 
Marion Conger's liability was conceded by the stipulation. 
She cannot now successfully contend that Louise Blair was 
an ulldisclosed principal and that by obtaining judgment 
against John Blair plaintiffs elected to release her from lia-
bility. (Williams v. General Ins. Co., 8 Cal.2d 1, 5 [63 P.2d 
289] ; Stanton v. Santa Ana Sugar Co., 84 Cal.App. 206, 210 
[257 P. 907J.) Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the stipula· 
tion and to try the case on the assumption that it remained 
for them only to prove that John Blair was also liable. 
8. Damo,ges. 
Defendants contend that the trial court' allowed plainti1ts 
excessive damages by awarding them $9,500 general damages 
for the difference between the market value of the property 
with and without the performance due under the contract. 
Their :first ground of attack is that plaintiffs failed to show 
that the injury was permanent. Defendants assert that they 
performed part of their obligations under the contract before 
the action came to trial and that they will perform the re-
mainder of their obligations in the future. They conclude 
I I, 
I 
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that since plaintifIs will thus have the improvements, they 
would be allowed a double recovery if they also recovered 
damages for failure to get the improvements. 
[8] The distinction defendants would draw between a 
permanent and a temporary injury has no relevance in a case 
invoh"ing a total breach of contract. In an action for dam-
ages for such a breach, the plaintifI in that one action 
recovers all his damages, past and prospective. (Abbott v. 
'76 Land & Wa,terCo., 161 Cal. 42, 47-48 [118 P. 425]; 
Van Horne v. Treadwell, 164 Cal. 620, 622 [130 P. 5] ; see, 
Corbin on Contracts, § 946.) [9] A judgment for the plaintifI 
in such an action absolves the defendant from any duty, con-
tinuing or otherwise, to perform the contract. (Noble v. 
Tweedy, 90 Cal.App.2d 738, 744 [203 P.2d 778].) The judg-
ment for damages is substituted for the wrongdoer's duty to 
perform the contract. (Rest., Contracts, § 313, com. C; 
South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lbr. Co., 179 
F. 417, 426 [102 C.C.A. 563].) 
[10] If there was a total breach of contract, plaintifIs 
properly brought their action for all their damages, general 
and special; since any subsequent action for additional dam-
ages would be successfully opposed by the plea of res judicata, 
plaintifIs 'injury is necessarily permanent. It would be 
anomalous for a court in the very judgment that substitutes 
a money award for defendants I performance, and divests the 
court of the power in the future to require performance or 
to award additional damages for breach, also to determine 
whether or not the defendant will nevertheless render the per-
formance from which he is absolved. Defendants rely on 
SpaUlding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d 265 [239 P.2d 625], where 
we held that in an action to abate a nuisance a plaintifI could 
not recover both an injunction abating a nuisance and dam-
ages on the theory that the nuisance was permanent. That 
ease would be in point here, if plaintifIs had obtained both 
damages for a total breach and a decree of specific perform-
ance requiring defendants to perform, or if defendants were 
still obliged to perform the contract. (See Wichita Falls 
Electric Co. v. HlIey (Tex.Civ.App.) , 246 S.W. 692, 694-695.) 
[11] If the breach is partial only, the injured party may 
recover damages for nonperformance only to the time of trial 
and may not recover damages for anticipated future nonper-
formance. (See Rischard v. Miller, 182 Cal. 351, 353 [188 
P. 50]; Rest., Contracts, § 313.) [12] Furthermore, even 
if a breach is total, the injured party may treat it as partial, 
\ 
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unless the wrongdoer has repudiated the contract. (Fresno 
Canal ct lrr. Co. v. Perrin, 170 Cal. 411, 415 [149 P. 805]; 
Rest., Contracts, § 317(2).) [13] The circumstances of 
each case determine whether the injured party may treat a 
breach of contract as total. (See, American Type etc. Co. v. 
Packer, 130 Cal. 459, 463 [62 P. 744]; Clarke Contracting 
Co. v. City of New York, 229 N.Y. 413, 419-420 [128 N.E. 
241] ; Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, 222 N.Y. 449, 453-
454 [119 N.E. 113] ; Corbin on Contracts, § 946.) [14] If, as 
in the present case, the injured party has fully performed his 
obligations under a bilateral contract, courts usually treat a 
breach as partial unless it appears that performance of the 
agreement is unlikely and that the injured party may be 
protected only by recovery of damages for the value of the 
promise. (Gold Min. ~ Water Co. v. Swinerton, 23 Ca1.2d 
19, 29·30 [142 P.2d 22]; Rest., Contracts, § 316.) 
Plaintiffs contend that there was a total breach on May 30, 
1949, the date that performance was due under the contract. 
Even if plaintiffs could have treated the breach as total at; 
that time, it is elear that they elected not to do so, for during 
the following year they kept urging defendants to perform. 
[15] A different situation was presented on May 24,1950, 
when plaintiffs brought the present action. At that time per-
formance was one year overdue. By seeking damages for the 
difference in the value of their property with and without 
performance, plaintiffs gave notice that they would no longer 
treat defendants' continued failure to perform as a partial 
breach. Defendants could not reaSonably expect plaintiffs to 
continue indefinitely to treat the breach as partial. Even if 
a breach might be considered partial at the time performance 
is due, there is a limit to the time a promisee must thereafter 
await performance. The trial court could reasonably conclude 
that that limit was reached here. It was not shown that 
despite defendants' delay, plaintiffs would be assured of 
getting the improvements. (Cf. South Memphis Land Co. v. 
McLean Hardwood Lbr. Co., 179 F. 417, 426 [102 C.C.A. 
5631.) Despite repeated requests by plaintiffs, defendants 
had not installed the improvements called for by the contract. 
It was uncertain when if ever they would do so.· Although 
defendants had not expressly repudiated the contract, their 
conduct clearly justified plaintiffs' belief that performance 
was either unlikely or would be forthcoming only when it 
suited defendants' convenience. Plaintiffs were not required 
to endure that uncertainty or to await that convenience and 
) 
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were therefore justified in treating defendants' nonperfor.m-
ance as a total breach of the contract. (See Gold Min. &- Water 
Co. v. Swinerton, supra; Walker v. Harbor Business Blocks 
Co., 181 Cal. 773, 780-781 [186 P. 356] ; Losei Realty Co. v. 
City of New York, 254 N.Y. 41, 47 [171 N.E. 899].) 
The question remains whether the court applied a proper 
measure of damages. [16] Unless a statute otherwise 
specifically provides, the proper measure of damages for the 
breach of a contract "is the amount which will compensate 
the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused 
thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be 
likely to result therefrom." (Civ. Code, § 3300.) Damages 
must, however, "be reasonable, and where an obligation of 
any kind appears to create a right to unconscionable and 
grossly oppressive damages, contrary to substantial justice, 
no more than reasonable damages can be recovered." (Civ. 
Code, § 3359.) In the present case the contract called for 
installation of improvements that would greatly increase the 
value of plaintiffs' property. The consideration was paid in 
advance. [17] If the work were to be done on plaintiffs' 
property the proper measure of damages would ordinarily 
be the reasonable cost to plaintiffs of completing the work. 
(Taylor v. North Pac. Coast R. Co., 56 Cal. 317, 320; Adams 
v. Hiner, 46 Cal.App.2d 681, 683 [116 P.2d 630] ; cf. Avery 
v. Fredericksen & Westbrook, 67 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [154 
P.2d 41] ; see Corbin on Contracts, §§ 1089-1091.) [18] A 
. different rule applies, however, when the improvements are 
to be made on property that is not owned by the injured party. 
In that event the injured party is unable to complete the work 
himself and, subject to the restrictions of sections 3300 and 
3359 of the Civil Code, the proper measure of damages is the 
difference in value of the property with and without the 
promised performance, since that is the contractual benefit 
of which the injured party is deprived. (Knoch v. Haizlip, 
163 Cal. 146, 154 [124 P. 998] ; South Memphis Land Co. v. 
McLean Hardwood Lbr. Co., 179 F. 417, 423-424 [102 C.C.A. 
563]; Hyatt v. Wiggins, 178 Ark. 1085 [13 S.W.2d 301, 303J.) 
In the present case the contract was to be performed' 
entirely on property that is not owned by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
did have a nonexclusive easement thereover. Defendants, 
however, had reserved an easement and right of way over the 
road, with the right of "constructing, maintaining, repairing, 
and operating the same." Plaintiffs proved their damages on 
the theory that the proper measure was the difference in 
) 
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value of Lot 7 with and without the promised performance. 
Defendants did not contend at the trial or on appeal that 
plaintiffs had the right to pave the road and install the gas 
line and electricity thereon, or that they would be able in-
dependently of defendants to get the improvements. In this 
state of the reeord, we are of the opinion that the trial court 
invoked the proper rule for measuring the general damages. 
(0/. Herzog v. Or08so, ante, pp. 219, 226 [259 P.2d 429].) 
The question arises whether the measure of damages 
applied by the court includes a double recovery. on the ground 
that it allows damages on the assumption that there had been 
no performance by defendants whereas plaintiffs got the bene-
fit of defendants' part performance during the period plain-
tiffs treated the breach as partial. If there were no perform-
ance by defendants between May 30, 1949, and May 24, 1950, 
there can be no doubt that the award of $9,500 damages was 
proper. If, on the other hand, defendants performed part 
of their contractual obligations to plaintiffs' benefit during 
the period that plaintiffs treated the breach as partial. de-
fendants should be allowed credit therefor, since it would 
be manifestly unjust to allow plaintiffs to. induce defendants 
to render such performance, and then to award plaintiffs dam· 
ages as if it had not occurred. 
The performance claimed by defendants breaks down into 
three activities: (1) at some time in the fall or winter of 
1949, temporary paving was placed on 1,225 feet of the road 
to the edge of Lot 7; (2) at some unspecified date in 1950 
permanent paving was installed on 1;200 feet of the road to 
Lot 7, commencing at the Nichols Canyon Road, leaving 1,300 
feet of the road with a dirt surface and the remaining 1,225 
.feet of the road with temporary paving only; and (3) at 
an unspecified date in May of 1950 a gas line was installed 
over the same 1,200 feet of road, leaving a 2,525-foot gap be-
tween the end of the line and plaintiffs' lot. 
Insofar as installation of the temporary }iaving is concerned, 
the record discloses that the benefit thereof to plaintiffs was 
included in the valuations made of the property. Witnesses 
Holabird and Vollmer testified that they had viewed the 
property shortly before the trial and that their appraisals 
were predicated on the condition of the road as it then existed. 
[19] Plainti1is contend that the amount of permanent pav-
ing and the amount of gas line installed did not enhance the 
value of the lot, on the ground that a gap of 2,525 feet left 
the lot as useless and its value as unchanged as a gap of 
/ 
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8,725 feet. The testimony of the valuation experts that with· 
out the improvements contracted for the lot was useless, lends 
some support to this contention. In any event, since it can-
not be ascertained from the record whether or not defendants 
installed the permanent paving and the gas line over the 
1,200 feet of road before or after plaintiffs filed their com· 
plaint, we must conclude that defendants failed to establish 
that they were entitled to credit therefor on the ground that 
this work was performed during the time plaintiffs treated 
the breach as partial. 
The next question presented is whether defendants should 
receive credit for performance after the complaint was filed 
and before the action came to trial. In addition to the in· 
stallation of the 1,200 feet of gas line and permanent paving, 
discussed above, defendants installed electricity to the edge 
of Lot 7 in August of 1950, more than two months after the 
complaint was filed, and began laying gas lines at a point 
2,500 feet from the lot and in its general direction about a 
week before trial. It was not shown that it was certain that 
the gas line would be brought to the edge of the lot. Neither 
party introduced evidence to show by what amount the in-
stallation of electricity without performance of the other 
obligations of the contract increased the value of the lot. Did 
the trial court err in applying its measure of damages in the 
absence of such evidence' 
Ordinarily this question does not arise. [20] If the in-
jured party accepts or urges performance by the promisor, 
he will not be allowed to obtain damages on the theory that 
performance has not been made. If the wrongdoer cannot 
induce the injured party to accept performance, he will 
ordinarily not perform. The record does not show why de-
fendants chose to continue performance after the action was 
brought.· [21] Plaintiffs did not urge performance after 
the complaint was filed, and they could not prevent it. By 
commencing the action they fully and fairly informed de-
fendants that instead of performance they sought money dam-
ages for the value of defendants' promise. Unless plaintiffs 
indicated that they were again willing to treat the breach as 
partial, the remedial rights provided by law were substituted 
for the rights under the contract. (Rest., Contracts, § 313. 
com. c.) Thereafter defendants were absolved from all 
ext is suggested in the briefs (but on the record this is entirely specula· 
tive) that defendants may have had contractual obligations to other pur· 
ehuers of Iota or wished to increase the value of their unsold Iota. 
/' 
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duties under the contract to furnish improvements. Sub-
sequent work to that end would not be performance of a con-
tract then existent but would be entirely voluntary. If 
prompted by defendants' self-interest in the sale of other 
lots, such gratuitous benefit, wholly speculative on the record, 
would not constitute unjust enrichment to plaintiffs. 
[22] Parties who have totally breached a contract cannot 
force performance on the injured parties. 
Defendants next contend that if the award of $9,500 is 
upheld, the award for loss of use of the property, $2,300.37, 
and the award for the increase in building costs, $3,700, must 
be reversed. 
[23] Damages are awarded in an action for breach of 
contract to give the injured party the benefit of his bargain 
and insofar as possible to place him in the same position 
he would have been in had the promisor performed the con-
tract. (Coburn v. California Portland Cement Co., 144 Cal. 
81, 84 [77 P. 771] ; Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal.App.2d 738, 745 
[203 P.2d 778).} [24] Damages must be reasonable, how-
ever, and the promisor is not required to compensate the in-
jured party for injuries that he had no reason to foresee as 
the probable result of his breach when he made the contract. 
(Civ. Code, § 3300; California Press Mfg. Co. v. Stafford 
Packing Co., 192 Cal. 479, 483 [221 P. 345, 32 A.L.R. 114) ; 
see Corbin on Contracts, § 1007.) 
Plaintiffs informed defendants at the time the contract 
was made that they were buying the lot as a site for a resi-
dence and that they needed the gas, electricity, and permanent 
paving installed within a year. Defendants were in the busi-
ness of selling lots as residence sites and were fully aware 
of the consequences of delay in their performance. They 
knew that the lot was less valuable without than with the 
improvements, and that plaintiffs would be deprived of the 
use of the lot for building purposes so long' as the contract 
was not performed. They also knew that an increase in build-
ing costs would add to the cost of the residence plaintiffs con-
templated building on the lot. Had the contract been per-
formed, plaintiffs would have had not only a more valuable 
lot than they now have but the use of that lot from the date 
performance was due for the erection of their residence. By 
defendants' breach of the contract, plaintiffs are not only left 
with a lot that is less valuable than it would have been had 
the contract been performed but they have been deprived of 
the use of the improved lot they bargained for and are faced 
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with increased building costs that would have been avoided 
had the contract been performed. [25] The award of dam-
ages for the difference in the value of the lot with and 
without the improvements compensates for the loss in the value 
of the lot. It does not compensate for the loss of use of the 
lot or the increased building costs. Accordingly, plaintiffs 
are entitled to damages for the loss of use4 and the increased 
building costs preceding the date they treated the breach as 
total, in addition to the $9,500. (Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 
418,424 [90 P. 1049] ; Henderson v. Oakes-Waterman, Bu,,1d-
ers,44 Cal.App.2d 615, 617-618 [112 P.2d 662].) 
The trial court erred, however, by including in the award 
damages for loss of use and increase in building cost during 
the. period between the date that the complaint was filed and 
the date of trial. Damages for delay during that period could 
be awarded only if defendant still had duties to perform. 
When plaintiffs filed their complaint, however, they elected 
to treat the breach as total and to substitute their remedies 
under the law for their rights under the contract. As we have 
seen, defendants were no longer obliged to perform and could 
not force performance on plaintiffs. Any delay in utilization 
of the property thereafter was chargeable to plaintiffs, not 
to. defendants. (See Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607, 
614 [220 P.2d 729]; Atkinson v. District Bond 00., 5 Cal. 
App.2d 738, 745 [43 P.2d 867]; Richardson v. Davis, 116 
Cal.App. 388. 390 r2 P.2d 860].) Defendants cannot be re-
quired to pay damages designed to give plaintiffs the benefit 
of their bargain as of the time of total breach, and also to 
pay damages because they did not thereafter do things they 
were no longer under any duty to do and for which they would 
get no credit. 
[26] By its award of damages, the trial court in effect 
attempted to compensate plaintiffs for the delay between the 
time they were entitled to damages and the time they were 
actually awarded damages in the form of the judgment. Such 
compensation is ordinarily given in the form of interest. Under 
section 3287 of the Civil Code. interest could not be awarded 
here, since the amount of damages could not be ascertained 
except on conflicting evidence. (Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal. 
2d 204. 212 [195 P.2d 408. 4 A.L.R.2d 1380].) 
"The trial court measured damages for 108s of use at the rate of 7 per 
eent per annum on the $14,000 purchase price paid hi advance. Neither 
party questions los8 of use of the money as a proper measure of damages 
for loss of use of the property. Plaintiff. did 110t appeal and defendants 
"ve claimed DO prejudice. 
I 
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The award for loss of use between the date of the com-
plaint and the date of trial cannot, therefore, be sustained. 
Although, as we have seen, plaintiffs may recover damages 
for the amount that building costs increased between the date 
specified for performance in the contract and the date that 
the complaint was filed, the only finding on the subject is 
that costs increased $3,700 between the date that performance 
was due and the date of trial. A retrial on that issue is there-
fore necessary. (Royer v. Carter, 37 Ca1.2d 544, 551 [233 
P.2d 539].) 
4. Findings of the Trial Court. 
Defendants contend that the evidence does not support 
the finding that the term "paving" in the contract was in-
tended by the parties to be "permanent paving conforming 
to the specifications of the City of Los Angeles for that area" 
and that such paving was a " 'plant mix' of three inches of 
rock, sand, and asphalt." [27] Extrinsic evidence was ad-
missible to determine what the parties meant by "paving." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1860; Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 
95, 104 [173 P.2d 17]; Wachs v. Wachs, 11 Ca1.2d 322, 325 
[79 P.2d 1085] ; Snyder v. Holt Mfg. Co., 134 Cal. 324, 328 
[66 P. 311].) Plaintiff Clarence Coughlin testified that de-
fendant John Blair stated at the time that the contract was 
executed that the pavement would be "State specifications, 
asphalt with asphalt shoulders." An expert witness subse-
quently testified that "city specifications" in the area called 
for three inches of rock and gravel. During the expert's t.es-
timony. the trial judge stated to defendants' counsel, "The 
testimony, if I understand it, is it was to be paved according 
to the City's specifications." Counsel replied, "That is the 
testimony so far." It thus appears that the case was tried 
on the understanding that "state specifications" and "city 
specifications" were the same thing, and defendants cannot 
successfully contend on appeal that the finding is not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
[28] Defendants next contend that the evidence does not 
support the finding that the difference between the market 
value of the property with and without performance of the 
contract was $9,500. Expert witnesses called by plaintiffs 
so testified, but defendants attack their valuations on the 
ground that the witnesses said they would not change their 
estimates "if they knew that some respectable person was 
under obligation to install electricity, gas, and paving." The 
contention is without merit. The witnesses gave their valua-
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tions of the lot with and without the improvements. Their 
valuations of the lot with improvements necessarily contem-
plated the improvements called for by the contract installed 
by a responsible person. Defendants' objection goes, not to 
the soundness of the appraisal, but to the question discussed 
above, whether defendants can avoid liability for the differ-
ence in the value of the lot with and without improvements 
if they should complete the improvements some time in the 
future. 
[29] Defendants contend that the evidence does not sup-
port the finding that, "The breach of said agreement by de-
fendants was deliberate. " That finding is material insofar as 
it bears on the question whether the breach was total or partial. 
Defendant John Blair admitted in his deposition, which was 
admitted in evidence and considered by the trial court in 
reaching its decision, tbat he did not make the deposit re-
quired by the gas company before it would extend its gas line 
to plaintiff's lot, although he had the financial ability to make 
the deposit. He stated that the electricity was not installed 
because of a dispute between defendants and the city depart-
ment of light and power over the interpretation of a contract 
between defendants and the city. At one point the city offered 
to install electricity to plaintiffs' lot without cost to defend-
ants, if defendants would waive a claim to certain other rights 
under their contract with the city. Defendants would not 
agree. Defendants did not install permanent paving because 
they took the position that only temporary paving was re-
quired by the contract. It thus appears that defendants had 
the ability to perform the contract but for reasons they thought 
to their advantage refused to do so. The finding that the 
breach was "deliberate" is supported by substantial evidence. 
Defendants finally attack the finding that the "construc-
tion cost of a 'minimum house' (i.e., a house built at minimum 
cost and having an area not exceeding 1500 square feet, the 
minimum building restrictions applicable to the lot purchased 
by plaintiffs) increased during the period from June, 1949, 
to the date of trial in the sum of $3,750.00. Plaintiffs have 
suffered special damage resulting from the increase of con-
struction costs on a 'minimum house' as above defined in the 
amount of $3,750.00." Although, as previously pointed out, 
a new trial is required on this issue, the question may recur 
at the retrial and it is therefore necessary that we pass on 
defendants' contention. 
[30] There is testimony that the building costs of a "min-
imum house" had increased by $3,750. Defendants contend, 
/ 
Oct. 1953] COUGHLIN 11. Bum 
[41 C.2d 587: 262 P.2d 305] 
however, that there is no proof that the damages were fore-
seeable or that they were caused by their breach. Plaintiffs 
told defendant John Blair on the day that the contract was 
signed that they intended to build a "three bedroom, rambling 
house with a playhouse and swimming pool. H It was testi-
fied that such a house would exceed 1,500 square feet. De-
fendants were thus informed of the use to which plaintiffs 
intended to put the property and the award of damages may 
not be attacked for lack of notice to defendants. (Reliance 
Accept. Corp. v. Hooper-Holmes Bureau, 139 Cal.App. 607, 
613 [84 P.2d 762].) Defendants contend that plaintitfB 
"never seriously contemplated building at all" and that, ac-
cordingly, plaintiffs failed to show that but for the breach, 
they would have taken advantage of lower costs. At the 
time the contract was signed, however, plaintiffs stated that 
they intended to bUild "the following spring," the time when 
performance was specified in the contract. Plaintiffs actu-
ally employed an architect in June, 1949, and received plans 
from him in the fall of 1950. The record sustains the con· 
clusion that but for the breach plaintiffs would have been 
able to take advantage of lower building costs in June, 1950. 
To the extent that it awards $9,500 general damages with 
interest thereon and costs, the judgment is affirmed. To the 
extent that it awards special damages for loss of use of the 
property and special damages resulting from the increase in 
building costs, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court to determine the damages result-
ing from loss of use of the property and from the increase in 
building costs between June 1, 1949 and Yay 24, 1950. De-
fendants are to bear the costs of this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J .. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
